Key lessons from the RESET programme: Recommendations for the resettlement of young offenders by Hazel, N et al.
Key lessons from the
RESET programme
Executive summary
Neal Hazel,Mark Liddle and Fionn Gordon
Contents
The evaluation team 2
Foreword 3
Introduction 3
Resettlement as a problem 3
About RESET 4





Centre for Social Research
(CSR-Salford), University of
Salford
The centre specialises in working closely
with policy makers, practitioners and the
wider community to produce relevant,
engaged and influential research.
By combining a wide range of subject,
methods and expertise, CSR-Salford
brings a huge research knowledge base
to bear on key social issues.
ARCS UK
ARCS is a national team of professional
researchers with long experience and
training in community safety, social
inclusion, economic regeneration, youth
offending, resettlement of offenders,
community development and partnership
working. The team has a track record for
producing high-quality research and
evaluation, committed to informing and
improving future practice.
www.arcs-ltd.com
Key lessons from the RESET programme: Executive summary
2
Foreword
The RESET initiative broke new ground
when it was launched in 2005. It was an
ambitious attempt to resolve the complex
problems faced by young people coming out
of custody. Rainer (now Catch22) used its
experience in working with young people
leaving care to broker multi-agency
approaches to resettlement in the pilot
areas. The Youth Justice Board (YJB) was
a partner organisation and drew upon the
experience of RESET in helping shape
the government's Youth Crime Action Plan
in 2008.
I welcome this executive briefing.Whilst it
doesn’t claim RESET to have been an
unqualified success, it does present the
complexity of the challenge and
demonstrates that there are many ways in
which significant successes can be achieved
for young people trying to establish a positive
lifestyle after being in custody. It is frank in its
description of the project’s limitations and
provides us with some clear messages to
inform the way we tackle resettlement into
the future. It also provides a useful
companion to the RESET cost benefit
analysis published by Rainer (now Catch22) in
2008.This was instrumental in helpingmake
the case for a new approach to resettlement
following the Youth Crime Action Plan.
The emerging success of the YJB
resettlement consortia pilots and Integrated
Resettlement Support is undoubtedly part
of the legacy of RESET, now attracting the
attention of the new government. As a result
of this continuous evolution, we are now
able to articulate more clearly the wider
benefits of getting resettlement right, as
well as those issues affecting the lives
of each young person we work with.We
welcome this contribution from Catch22
as we enter a challenging and exciting period
in this area.
Frances Done
Chair, Youth Justice Board
October 2010
Introduction
Recognised in the Youth Crime Action Plan,1
resettlement of young people after serving a
custodial sentence is an issue of pressing
concern in youth justice policy and practice.
Despite research awareness and policy
intention, problems are still persistent in
ensuring that offenders return home to a
supportive and structured lifestyle that’s
conducive to the prevention of reoffending.
The resettlement, education, support,
employment and training (RESET)
programme was a major experimental
resettlement project run by a large
consortium, led by Catch22’s legacy
organisation, Rainer. The programme ran
from 2005 to 2007 and was funded by
European Equal. The project was evaluated
by the Centre for Social Research (CSR,
Salford) and ARCS-UK on behalf of Rainer
(now Catch22).
This executive briefing summarises the
findings and messages from the evaluation
report2 and a subsequent seminar with key
policy stakeholders, including key lessons
for mainstream resettlement support.
The full version of this summary,Evaluation
of the RESET programme – Final report, is
available on the Catch22 website –
www.catch-22.org.uk.
Resettlement as a problem
Reoffending rates for young offenders
released from custody are high. Of
approximately 6000 young people
sentenced to custody each year, between
70% and 90% will reoffend within 12
months.3 Reoffending can occur quickly
after release, with previous research
estimating that about a third reoffend
within the first month.4,5 Effective
resettlement is crucial to achieving
better outcomes for young people
leaving custody.
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It has been recognised that young people
leaving custody are not treated in a
consistent way.6 Research has suggested
that only a minority of young people are
involved in education, training or
employment (ETE) during the licence period
of their sentence. Difficulties in inter-agency
cooperation have been highlighted as
leading to a breakdown in provision,
resulting in support not being in place
prior to release.7
The Youth Crime Action Plan8 highlighted how
important effective resettlement is in
ensuring that young people released from
custody are able to meet safeguarding and
Every Child Matters outcomes. However, it
also noted how delivering such provision is
‘complicated’.9
About RESET
RESET was a major resettlement project,
involving over 50 national partners who
came together to innovate and improve
provision for young people released from
custody. Funded from 2005 to 2007, the
project was led by Rainer, now incorporated
into Catch22. RESET aimed to:
 raise awareness of the issues
 influence policymakers to adopt best
practice
 reduce reoffending levels by improving
resettlement services




The RESET project operated locally in seven
Youth Offending Team (YOT) areas across two
regions of England (London and the North
West), and an institution, CookhamWood
young offenders institute (YOI) for girls. This
three-way split is important because each
operated a different model for resettlement:
 The North West used a ‘case
management’model where the worker(s),
funded by RESET, became a member
of the casework Youth Offending Team,
but took on more custody cases than
normal.
 In London, the RESET worker did not
manage individual cases, but took on
a ‘coordinating’ role, responsible for
arranging multi-agency resettlement
support. They focused on developing
partnerships with state, voluntary
and private stakeholders in order to
address the range of needs presented
by offenders leaving custody (as
identified by case managers).
 In CookhamWood, resettlement activity
was ‘institution based’, including
outreach work after release. As such,
planning for resettlement support after
release was primarily coordinated and
followed-up by RESET staff within the
institution rather than the local YOTs.
The evaluation findings suggest outcome
differences between these areas, indicating




The evaluation of RESET ran from 2005
to 2007. The quantitative data collection
included 208 information forms at the
point of project entry and departure, and
ongoing details of 150 activities,
supplemented by 137 Asset forms.
Qualitative data included 90 interviews
with key stakeholders and staff (50 at
the start and 40 at the end), supplemented
by seven focus groups with staff and four
parent interviews.
Please see the full report10 for details
and methodological limitations.
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The cohort
In total, 208 young people (‘beneficiaries’)
were involved with RESET, entering the project
over a 27-month period between January 2005
and April 2007.After an initial trickle of
entrants,most activity occurred in the year
from autumn 2005 to autumn 2006.About half
were in the North West region (51%),with 41%
in London and 12% in CookhamWood.They
stayed involved with RESET staff for an
average length of sevenmonths,but
three-quarters (75%) continued involvement
beyond the end of their sentence.
The large majority of beneficiaries were male
(81%) and half were at least 17-years-old.
Slightly less than the wider young offender
custody population were white (62%), with a
quarter black, and a small number Asian
(4%). Almost half (43%) were considered by
YOT workers to be vulnerable.More than
two-thirds (71%) had no qualifications (67%
for those aged over 17), and the majority
(56%) had not been involved with education,
training or employment immediately before
custody. Excluding the CookhamWood
group, over two-thirds (69%) were recorded
as persistent young offenders, and the group
had a mean average of 29.4 convictions.
Custodial sentences
Those in London and the North West served
sentences in 18 different institutions.
Although two-thirds (69%) stayed in one
institution throughout their sentence,more
than a quarter moved at least once (28%).
A minority (6%) moved more often, which
would make planning and delivering a
continuous sentence more difficult.
Important for trying to coordinate release
and resettlement, two in five beneficiaries
were serving the last part of their custodial
sentence in an establishment more than 50
miles from their home.
Beneficiaries’ needs
According to RESET and YOT workers’
assessments, the young people hadmultiple
areas of need that might hinder successful
resettlement or prevent reoffending. The
majority needed more constructive activities
(61%), half needed more help with
addressing offending behaviour (50%), about
half had unemployment issues (46%), and
two in five (39%) had low qualifications or
skills affecting future employment. In
addition,more than a third had substance
misuse problems (39%) and/or family
problems (35%), with a substantial minority
having issues relating to anger management
(27%) and homelessness (23%).
Given these multiple needs, it is not
surprising that the workers planned to
involvemultiple agencies for each case
(median average of four).Moreover,more
than a quarter (29%) planned to involve six
or more agencies and stakeholders. The
most common intended partners were:
 Connexions
 other YOT staff
 other resettlement projects and schools.
Offending behaviour and
breachable actions
About half of the young people involved with
RESET (48%) did something that was
against their licence conditions during
their supervision period, for example failure
to attend supervision meetings or specified
education; or offending. This is similar to
previous figures for custodial sentences.11
The majority first started to show problems
by failing to attend a supervision meeting
(52%) or getting into trouble (25%).
If a beneficiary was going to commit a
breachable act, it usually occurred early
in supervision – 50% of young people
breaching did so in the first two weeks after
release from custody. Navigating this early
period was critical for longer-term success.
About a third of beneficiaries (30%) offended
and were arrested during their supervision
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period (offending rate). This is significantly
less than previous figures for custodial
sentences.12 Of those arrested, approximately
two-thirds were recalled to custody.
Interestingly, the offending rate differed
greatly by RESET area, and therefore
seemed to suggest and influence the
different approaches to resettlement.
The North West area (largely case
management model) had a reoffending
rate of 41%, almost equal to previous
custodial figures. However, the London area
(coordinatingmodel) cut that reoffending
rate by almost half (22%). Further research
is needed to explore the factors involved
in this relationship. CookhamWood
(institution-based model) only had a 5%
reoffending rate, although this was a very
different demographic group.
Needs actually addressed
For each type of need that workers intended
to address in order to reduce reoffending,
only a minority of cases saw the problem
actually tackled. However, substance
misuse (46%), offending behaviour (42%)
and homelessness (40%) were the areas
most commonly tackled.
Areas receiving support in less than a third
of intended cases included unemployment
(32%), anger management (29%),
employability (22%), low qualifications
or skills (19%) and mental health issues
(1 in 10). This indicated substantial problems
with engaging other stakeholders to meet
the needs of the young offenders.
According to Asset data, the proportion of
young people with housing problems at the
end of their involvement with RESET was
almost identical as those with housing
problems when they first joined the project
(23% to 24%) – no improvement was
evident.
On average, the RESET workers managed to
involve only half the number of intended
agencies to address beneficiaries’ holistic
needs (median of two, instead of the
planned four). In contrast to workers’ plans
for a quarter of cases, only 7% actually
involved six or more stakeholders.
However, the success rate for RESET
workers involving partners in addressing
beneficiaries’ problems varied greatly
among the different stakeholder groups.
As a percentage of those intended to get
involved with RESET, the most successful
partnerships were with other social support
agencies, for example other resettlement
projects (79% of cases) and social services
(70%). There was less success involving
other agencies from the state sector,
including the local education authority
(40%), schools (43%) and training providers
(36%). There was notably low engagement
with the voluntary sector (1 in 11) and
local employers (7%). These difficulties
would affect beneficiaries’ engagement
in ETE.
Tackling offending behaviour was hindered
by poor information flow between
institution and resettlement workers.
No information on offending work that had
been undertaken in custody was received by
resettlement workers in half of cases (49%).
Only in about two in every five cases (38%)
did resettlement workers feel that they had
enough information to form a continuous




Just more than half of beneficiaries (57%)
were involved in any form of ETE at any
point during the supervision period of their
sentence. Although there may have been
reluctance on the part of individual young
people, there was clear evidence that
system breakdown preventedmore ETE
activity. For example, full information on
education or training carried out in custody
was only received in 60% of cases, and in
just over half of cases (53%) was it
considered by resettlement workers that a
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continuous programme in ETE could
possibly have been arranged. These figures
are similar to previous research.13
Cost–benefit analysis
The financial costs and benefits of
rolling-out RESET enhanced resettlement
across all custodial placements were
analysed by Judy Renshaw.14 The results
showed that the RESET package cost
£8,074 a year for a young person with a
medium level of need. However, when the
likely reductions in frequency and
seriousness of offending were factored in,
there was an annual net saving of at least
£12,333 for every offender. Considering
that approximately 6,500 young people
are given Detention and Training Orders
(DTOs) each year in England and Wales,
rolling-out enhanced resettlement
practice would bring total annual savings
to the public purse of over £80million.
Conclusions
Project successes
As a resettlement policy and practice
project, RESET could count a number of
successes.
 It raised policy awareness at local and
national levels – resettlement was
acknowledged as a key issue.
 Committed staff tried different
resettlement approaches – given the
space to think strategically.
 It provided extra resources for local
innovation, highlighting the importance
of funding for trying out promising ideas,
although still costing a lot less than
custody.
 It built local expertise in resettlement –
ensuring better understanding and
services to address the problems.
 It was flexible enough to allow local
variation – allowing some local autonomy
to address local needs.
 It developed and disseminated national
guidance and practice tools – developed
in partnership with young people.
 It facilitated new partnerships at local
and national levels – with an enthusiasm
by stakeholders to engage with the
issues and support interventions.
 It brought stronger links between service
providers – the crux of the RESET
success depended on good working
relations between agencies and
stakeholders.
 Mainstreaming was evident – the
resulting recognition of the importance
of resettlement saw innovations and
improvements incorporated into
everyday practice.
 It showed that a focus on resettlement
support, particularly in areas where there
was a focus on coordination, seemed to
have an impact on reoffending rates.
However, further longer-term
reconviction research is needed.
‘There have been great changes in the links
we have with other agencies now and the
RESET worker was very involved in that. We
have better links with training agencies and
with the secure estate.’
Local YOT manager
Project limitations
As with all innovations, RESET suffered
some limitations,many of which suggest
lessons for future resettlement projects and
practice.
 There was a lack of clarity about the
respective roles and responsibilities
for partners – a crucial lesson for
multi-agency partnerships necessary
in resettlement.
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 There was a lack of clarity about the
precise aims and nature of RESET – a
reminder of the common problem with
partnership projects from large funding
bids.
 RESET work bowed to other priorities
such as statutory demands. In a sector
with limited resources, resettlement may
be squeezed unless underpinned by
policy prioritisation/targets.
 The time-limited nature of funding meant
that the project was only fully operating
for 15 out of 27 months, after set-up and
before winding down – a lesson about
the limitation of short-term funding that
combines with staff and client
uncertainty.
 Although staff in a national or local
partner agency signed up to the aims of
RESET, they did not necessarily receive
the necessary support or resources from
chief executives – highlighting the
importance of senior-level support.
 There were problems with engaging
local stakeholders – forming local
partnerships was highlighted as a
complex process that will take time.
On average, only half of intended
partners were engaged on any one case,
resulting in only the minority of young




 RESET reminded us that young offenders
leaving custody have complexmultiple
needs that need to be addressed to
prevent reoffending. These needs cannot
be met by one agency alone and need
input from various stakeholder groups,
both within and outside of the youth
justice system.These groups include
those from the private and voluntary
sectors.
 Effective resettlement depends on
engaging and coordinating these
stakeholders. This is problematic, and
resettlement support fails because of a
lack of engagement with stakeholders.
Potential partners need to understand
the importance of resettlement to
preventing reoffending and the long-term
cost-effectiveness of their input. Local
authority agencies should understand
the relevance of resettlement for the
safeguarding and well-being of this
vulnerable group and their families.
Committed and sustainable partnerships
need to be formed early in any
resettlement process.
 This partnership coordination is not
an easy task and needs to be well
resourced.Resettlement should be
a priority area for sustainable funding
in youth justice.
 Local youth offending services need
a dedicated resettlement manager
whose role should focus on partnership
coordination rather than casework.
Results suggest that having an effective
coordinator may halve reoffending
rates, although further research
(including full reconviction studies)
is needed.
 The transition period between custody
and community is crucial, and if licence
conditions are going to be breached, it
often happens in the first few weeks
(or days) after release. Currently, support
is often not arranged for this period
prior to release, particularly in relation
to ETE and housing. This needs to be
set up early, with all partners on board
before release.
 There is rarely a continuous programme
of support from custody to community in
any area – ETE, addressing offending
behaviour or mental health support.
Indeed, there are problems with
information flow across these settings.
If the DTO intention of a continuous
sentence is to be met, and effective
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resettlement support achieved, there
needs to be better coordination of
intervention between the two phases.
 If enhanced resettlement was rolled-out
across all secure custodial placements,
there could be annual savings to the
public purse of over £80million.
Developments since RESET
Since RESET, the YJB has underlined the
importance of resettlement by supporting
a number of aftercare initiatives,many of
which begin to respond to some of the
concerns highlighted by RESET.
 In February 2006, the YJB published
its action plan, Youth resettlement:
A framework for action15, highlighting
the need for attention in this area.
 The Youth Crime Action Plan 200816
reflected the policy support for
resettlement found by RESET by
stressing its importance in breaking the
cycle of offending. It supported the need
for greater involvement of local authority
Children’s Services departments. It
repeated the RESET conclusion that
adequate plans and provision should be
in place prior to release from custody.
Further, it reflected the importance of
having a lead professional responsible
for resettlement in each local youth
justice service.
 Integrated Resettlement Support17
(IRS; 2009−10), supported by Ministry
of Justice funding, indicated a change in
emphasis to the integrated partnership
working central to the RESET
conclusions.
 Two resettlement consortia18 (2009−10),
delivered by theYJB,are piloting innovative
approaches to resettlement in North West
and SouthWest England.They are
responding in particular to the RESET
concern for greater collaboration between
youth justice and other types of statutory
and non-statutory agencies.They are also
to address concerns highlighted herewith
continuity and information sharing through
the custody–community transition.
 In Wales, Resettlement Support Panels19
have been established in six pilot areas.
This is a further approach to coordinating
local multi-agency delivery of
resettlement support, similar to the
Youth Inclusion and Support Panel
(YISP) model.
 The Resettlement Service Finder20
supports the need to engage with a wide
variety of service providers to meet the
diverse needs of this vulnerable group.
 A YJB-Foyer Federation partnership21
attempts to tackle some of the housing
issues highlighted, by providing learning





 Custody makes a continuous programme
of support and rehabilitation of a young
offender more difficult. Policymakers
should renew their commitment to
reducing custody.
 Resettlement agencies should be given
resource space in this vital area to
consider local issues strategically,
operationalise what works, and form
innovative partnerships and practice.
Funding for effective resettlement costs
a lot less than the inevitable alternative
– more crime and a return to custody.
 Enhanced resettlement work lends itself
to newmodels of financing, such as the
Social Finance22 model of social impact
bonds. Policymakers should explore a
way of reconfiguring existing service
delivery so that new approaches can
demonstrate effectiveness (including
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‘soft measures’, such as increased civic
engagement) and attract additional
finance.
 Policy and projects on resettlement
should balance the need for very clear
aims and added value, with the need to
retain some local flexibility to address
local issues.
 Each youth offending service should have
their own resettlement specialist, to
ensure better understanding of key
issues, address local needs and make
the most of local resources.
 Recruitment and training should focus on
skills for coordinating local partnerships
– a management role different from other
youth case work.
 Consideration should be given to a role
for custodial institutions in managing
support after release to ensure a
smoother transition. At the very least,
this may mean custodial staff attending
case meetings after release.
Local partnerships
 Local resettlement specialists should
focus on developing and coordinating
partnershipswith local stakeholders,
rather than just adopting a caseworker
role. Committed partnerships with a
range of different stakeholders are the
key to effective resettlement support.
 Awide range of partnerships is needed
(nationally and locally) in order to
address the holistic support needs of
this complex group. Resettlement
workers should be encouraged to seek
outside agency help.
 Effective partnerships are challenging to
develop and maintain. Potential local
stakeholders should be engaged early in
any resettlement service development.
 Particular attention should be given to
engage partners beyond youth justice
providers, including voluntary sector and
local employers. These groups are
difficult to engage, but can meet
widespread needs for offenders.
 Other state sector agencies, including
a range of local authority children’s
services, housing and health services are
crucial to meeting the needs of these
vulnerable young people.National and
local policymakers should take steps to
ensure that these agencies understand
the cost-effectiveness of resettlement
work and the links with safeguarding the
well-being of the young people.
 National policymakers should develop
more guidance and best practice in
developing local partnerships.
Preparation for release
 Agencies should focus particular
support on the early period after release.
This is critical to avoiding breaching.
Arrangements should be made for a clear
supervision meeting schedule, but with
flexibility from workers.
 Arrangements for ETE should already be
in place in time for release from custody.
This should be a key target. Alternative
activities should be arranged for those
released out of school term time.
 Particular attention should be paid to
ensuring immediate housing provision
for young people coming out of custody,
both to prevent homelessness and
staying with offending peers.
 Policymakers and practitioners should
prioritise developing ways to dovetail
custody and community phases.
Custodial institutions should emphasise
preparing young people for release,
focusing on the impact of transition
and readjustment.
 There needs to be careful planning and
preparation relating to the eventual
release. This will include communication
with a range of stakeholders as well as
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requiring the opportunity to visit home on
day release. This is reliant on more




 Information about work done in custody
must be passed to the community in




 Communication and planning would be
helped by reducing the number of times
a young offender is transferred between
custodial establishments.
 Attention should be paid to trying to fulfil
the DTO’s intention of a continuous
programme of intervention through
custody to community.Support and
training in both settings should be
coordinated to ensure continuity of
provision.
 Further steps should be taken to ensure
the consistent completion of Asset
forms (or alternative) to monitor young
people’s needs, and support them
throughout their sentence. This may
mean work on ensuring a common




 Widespread partnership coordination to
address offenders’multiple needs.
 Effective cooperation between custodial
institutions and community agencies to
ensure preparedness for release.
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